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Understanding the subtle pressures and biases that influence the 
way we behave might provide a far more effective education for future 
practitioners than studying professional standards alone. In her 
companion piece to this Article, published in the same issue, Dr. Paula 
Schaefer highlights the obvious importance of considering ethical 
decision-making through the lens of the broad variety of behavioral 
factors that influence how individuals conduct themselves within 
organizations.1 In her piece, Dr. Schaefer considers how context can 
provide far greater insight into actual decisions than simply a review of 
professional rules. Rules alone have failed to protect society from bad 
behavior by professionals.  
It is tempting to begin this short analysis by referencing the most 
recent transgressions of those professionals in whom society places trust. 
It is interesting to study the history of any profession and observe how 
all writers (including ourselves), in whatever era and discussing 
 
†  Professor Emeritus, Institute for Management and Innovation, University 
of Toronto. 
††  Professor of Business Law and Ethics, School of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Waterloo. I thank Dr. Cassandra Burke Robertson and the 
editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for the invitation to 
participate in 2018 Leet Symposium: Fiduciary Duty, Corporate Goals, 
and Shareholder Activism, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, November 2, 2018 and the panel Ethical Challenges in the Role of 
In-House Counsel in particular. 
1. Paula Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics Lessons for Corporate Counsel, 
69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 975 (2019). 
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whichever profession, motivate our work.2 The basic question is always: 
where were the lawyers, accountants, actuaries, engineers, etc.?3 Why 
did bad things happen? The follow up and more fundamental 
observation is this—there are few corporate frauds or failures that take 
place without the active assistance of professionals, all well versed in 
ethical principles.4 How then do these transgressions occur? 
The focus of this Article will not be major ethical breaches or active 
fraud by any individual professional. There have always been, and no 
doubt will continue to be, individuals for whom any sense of moral 
compass is lacking. When offered the opportunity to engage actively in 
unethical behavior, say fraud, they do not resist. Part of our disinterest 
in analyzing the behavior of the really bad actors is our general 
frustration with the common defense by those remaining in 
organizations, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s—the defense of 
the solitary “bad apple.”5 By isolating bad decision-making to one or 
two individuals, the institutions in which the transgressors operate are 
effectively deemed free from responsibility. Moreover, short of imposing 
more and more effective control systems, little can be done to prevent 
the actions of the truly bad individuals if the actions are well executed. 
The argument that will be made here, and indeed which is 
consistent with the work of Dr. Schaefer, is the need to focus upon the 
subtle shifts in behavior and reasoning that can result from the context 
in which all professionals operate, and which may, under certain 
conditions, lead to less than optimal ethical decision-making by anyone. 
The panel for which this Article was originally prepared addressed 
the in-house counsel profession and, in particular, the ethical challenges  
2. The lawyers of firms such as Enron have been accused of supporting—or, 
at least, not inhibiting—the questionable actions of their clients. See Hugh 
Gunz & Sally Gunz, Hired Professional to Hired Gun: An Identity Theory 
Approach to Understanding the Ethical Behaviour of Professionals in 
Non-Professional Organizations, 60 Hum. Rel. 851, 851–52 (2007) (“The 
ethics of business-related professionals have had something of a cloud of 
suspicion hanging over them in recent years.”); Don A. Moore et al., 
Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral 
Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 10, 10 
(2006). 
3. Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, 
Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 495, 497 
(2012) (discussing how people question the role of lawyers after recent 
financial scandals such as Enron). 
4. Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Ethical Decision Making and the Employed 
Lawyer, 81 J. Bus. Ethics 927, 927 (2008). 
5. For example, see clips repeatedly using “bad apple” in The Corporation. 
The Corporation, THE CORPORATION [1/23] What Is a Corporation?, 
YouTube (Jan. 22, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
Pin8fbdGV9Y [https://perma.cc/74UV-QS7E] (using clips from several 
reporters, politicians, and news sources). 
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its members face. This is not a new concern, although in the past the 
academic literature often addressed very specific professional practice 
issues such as that of attorney-client privilege.6 Arguably, this focus 
evolved from the growth of in-house practice as a unique form of 
professional practice, distinct from law practice in general.7 While this 
is not the place to explore the history of corporate counsel practice,8 
there is no doubt that the real impetus for its modern form followed 
from shifts within the overall profession, documented by the work of 
Chayes and Chayes and others.9 
The discussion that follows will address first the evolution of the 
study of ethical decision-making by professionals and in-house counsel 
in particular. Second, it will consider Dr. Schaefer’s interest in 
behavioral ethics within the framework of legal practice, including in-
house counsel practice. The final section will consider how professions 
might better address their fundamental responsibility to meet society’s 
needs. 
I. The Evolution of the Study of Ethical Decision-
Making by Professionals and In-House Counsel in 
Particular 
There is little doubt that the evolution of the academic study of 
ethical decision-making was encouraged by the occurrence of major 
corporate scandals. While these have always existed, a useful beginning 
point in the modern era10 might be the savings and loans crisis of the 
 
6. See Amy L. Weiss, In-House Counsel Beware: Wearing the Business Hat 
Could Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 393, 393 
(1998); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1721, 1721–22 (2005). 
7. For example, in Canada it took some time before the Canadian Corporate 
Counsel Association could gain recognition as the unique entity within 
the Canadian Bar Association that represented corporate counsel. See 
The Canadian Bar Association, https://www.ccca-accje.org/Who-
We-Are/About-us/History [https://perma.cc/5757-BMF6] (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
8. For a more detailed history, see Sally Gunz & Marianne Jennings, The 
University Counsel: The Role and Its Challenges, 33 Notre Dame J. L. 
Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 177 (forthcoming 2019). 
9. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite 
Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 277–78 (1985). 
10. Fiscal scandals have undoubtedly existed as long as humanity has had 
any system that exposes individuals to the risk of fraud by others. The 
classic cases we can turn to from early modern history would be those of 
the Tulip Bulb Crash (1630s) and the South Sea Bubble (1711). Andrew 
Beattie, Market Crashes: The Tulip and Bulb Craze (1630s), 
Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/features/crashes/crashes2.asp 
[https://perma.cc/PCY3-GYNN] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019); Andrew 
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1980s,11 which spurred a flurry of exploration of the role that 
accountants played in particular events (and, to a lesser extent, 
lawyers).12 There was no doubt that the primary focus of academic 
study was the role of independent professionals working within 
professional service firms (“PSFs”) and auditors specifically.13 However, 
there was also starting to be interest in the role of the employed 
professionals, those working within the often subsequently failed 
institutions. If we consider the ideal (or traditional) model of the 
professional practitioner as that of working within autonomous 
professional practice (the PSFs), what happens to decision-making by 
those same professionals when they are now directly employed by 
managers who do not owe the same allegiance to professional rules as 
does the employee professional? Rather, the manager has a primary 
responsibility to the entity for whom all parties work (non-professional 
organizations or “NPOs”). And, of course, this same responsibility is 
also owed by the employed professional. 
Academic writers responded to this question by making the 
observation that employed professionals effectively serve two masters; 
professionals must continue to meet the ethical obligations of their 
profession and also the same ethical obligations to the employing 
institution as does the manager.14 Such a position was in turn assumed 
to give rise to what became known as Organizational-Professional 
 
Beattie, Market Crashes: The South Sea Bubble (1711), Investopedia, 
https://www.investopedia.com/features/crashes/crashes3.asp [https://perma. 
cc/MA2Q-UFH8] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). While it is almost quaint to 
consider speculation in something as odd as a tulip bulb as the cause of 
such financial tragedy, future generations may well react with similar 
surprise to something as seemingly daft as Bre-X or perhaps Bitcoin. 
Sunny Freeman, Gold: The Movie About the Bre-X Mining Scandal That 
‘Isn’t About Bre-X’, Fin. Post (Jan. 20, 2017, 10:36 AM), https:// 
business.financialpost.com/commodities/mining/gold-the-movie-about-the-
bre-x-mining-scandal-that-isnt-about-bre-x [https://perma.cc/VC6H-WS9R].  
11. Kenneth J. Robinson, Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989, Fed. Res. 
Hist., 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings_and_loan_crisis 
[https://perma.cc/U4PW-NK3F] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
12. See Arthur R. Wyatt, Accounting Professionalism—They Just Don’t Get 
It!, 18 Acct. Horizons 45, 48–50 (2004); Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. 
Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part I, 17 Acct. 
Horizons 189, 189 (2003); Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting 
Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part II, 17 Acct. Horizons 267, 267 
(2003) [hereinafter Zeff, Part II]. 
13. Id. 
14. For an early examination, see James E. Sorensen, Professional and 
Bureaucratic Organization in the Public Accounting Firm, 42 Acct. Rev. 
553 (1967). 
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Conflict (“OPC”);15 the ethical demands of the external profession and 
the employer itself may conflict. 
Stepping back, professions generally exist by dint of a form of social 
contract.16 They are provided a position of considerable privilege by 
society—often a monopoly over particular services17—and in return 
must exercise their art in a manner that is independent of self-interest 
and uphold the high-minded principles developed by the profession 
itself. In common law countries, members of professions also are held 
to be in a fiduciary relationship with their clients or users of services 
under particular circumstances.18 At the same time, employers also have 
a right to command loyalty in decision-making by employees. While 
engineers, nurses and other professionals within employment 
relationships were the focus of the original studies of OPC,19 members 
of the accounting profession became of particular concern often because 
of their key roles in failing to prevent—perhaps even enabling—
corporate failures.20 
Although OPC was a logical proposition—that there may be 
inherent conflicts between the demands of the two sets of ethical 
obligations—there was in fact, at least initially, little evidence of 
professionals identifying such conflicts in practice.21 Several empirical  
15. See, e.g., James E. Sorensen & Thomas L. Sorensen, The Conflict of 
Professionals in Bureaucratic Organizations, 19 Admin. Sci. Q. 98, 105 
(1974); Adrian Harrell et al., Organizational-Professional Conflict and the 
Job Satisfaction and Turnover Intentions of Internal Auditors, 5 
Auditing 109, 110 (1986). 
16. “When a man [sic] becomes a member of a profession, he undertakes an 
honourable calling. His duty is to serve the interests of the public.” 
Alexander M. Carr-Saunders & Paul A. Wilson, The 
Professions 421 (1933) (citing Fred Bullock, Handbook for 
Veterinary Surgeons 13–14 (1927)). 
17. See Id. at 352–65 (discussing professional registers that allowed certain 
registered professionals, such as pharmacists and teachers, to corner the 
market). 
18. See, e.g., Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377 (Can.) (finding that 
financial advisors are often, but not always, considered fiduciaries of their 
clients). 
19. See Carr-Saunders & Wilson, supra note 16, at 1; Talcott Parson, 
The Professions and Social Structure, 17 Soc. Forces 457, 458 (1939). 
20. See W. Richard Scott, Reactions to Supervision in a Heteronomous 
Professional Organization, 10 Admin. Sci. Q. 65 (1965) (discussion the 
potential for professional behavior to be distorted by the employment 
relation); Zeff, Part II, supra note 12. 
21. See Seymour Adler & Nissim Aranya, A Comparison of the Work Needs, 
Attitudes, and Preferences of Professional Accountants at Different 
Career Stages, 25 J. Voc. Behav. 45, 53–55 (1984) (finding that 
accountants organizational and professional commitment tended to 
increase over time); Harold L. Angle & James L. Perry, Organizational 
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studies demonstrated that professionals seldom reported experiencing 
such conflicts.22 
Our own interest in these issues stemmed from studying the role of 
in-house counsel in organizations generally, and the question of the 
competing and even conflicting loyalties, or OPC, was intriguing.23 The 
work on OPC focused on professions that in many respects originated 
from serving the needs of organizations, businesses, and commerce in 
particular. As such, it should not be such a surprise that members of 
those professions, whether they were engineers, scientists, or 
 
Commitment: Individual and Organizational Influences, 10 Work & 
Occupations 123, 143–44 (1983); N. Aranya et al., An Examination of 
Professional Commitment in Public Accounting, 6 Acct. Orgs. & Soc. 
271, 276–77 (1981); Nissim Aranya & Kenneth R. Ferris, A 
Reexamination of Accountants’ Organizational‐Professional Conflict, 64 
Acct. Rev. 1, 11–12 (1984) [hereinafter Aranya & Ferris, 
Reexamination]; P. K. Berger & A. J. Grimes, Cosmopolitan‐Local: A 
Factor Analysis of the Construct, 18 Admin. Sci. Q. 223, 234 (1973); 
John A. Brierley & Christopher J. Cowton, Putting Meta‐Analysis to 
Work: Accountants’ Organizational‐Professional Conflict, 24 J. Bus. 
Ethics 343, 351–52 (2000); Arthur P. Brief & Ramon J. Aldag, 
Antecedents of Organizational Commitment Among Hospital Nurses, 7 
Soc. Work & Occupations 210, 217–18 (1980); Jeffrey R. Cornwall & 
Andrew J. Grimes, Cosmopolitan‐Local: A Cross‐Lagged Correlation 
Analysis of the Relationship Between Professional Role Orientations and 
Behaviors in an Academic Organization, 40 Hum. Rel. 281, 293–94 
(1987); Victor E. Flango & Robert B. Brumbaugh, The Dimensionality of 
the Cosmopolitan‐Local Construct, 19 Admin. Sci. Q. 198, 201 (1974); 
Frank Friedlander, Performance and Orientation Structure of Research 
Scientists, 6 Org. Behav. & Hum. Perf. 169, 182 (1971); Hugh Gunz 
& Sarah P. Gunz, Professional/Organizational Commitment and Job 
Satisfaction for Employed Lawyers, 47 Hum. Rel. 801, 814–15 (1994); 
Adrian Harrell et al., Organizational‐Professional Conflict and the Job 
Satisfaction and Turnover Intentions of Internal Auditors, 5 Auditing: 
J. Prac. & Theory 109, 115–16 (1986); Lawrence R. Jauch et al., 
Organizational Loyalty, Professional Commitment, and Academic 
Research Productivity, 21 Acad. Mgmt. J. 84, 88–89 (1978); Ran 
Lachman & Nissim Aranya, Evaluation of Alternative Models of 
Commitments and Job Attitudes of Professionals, 7 J. Occupational 
Behav. 227, 239 (1986); John E. Mathieu & Karin Hamel, A Causal 
Model of the Antecedents of Organizational Commitment Among 
Professionals and Nonprofessionals, 34 J. Voc. Behav. 299, 313–14 
(1989); Buck K.W. Pei & Frederick G. Davis, The Impact of 
Organizational Structure on Internal Auditor Organizational‐Professional 
Conflict and Role Stress: An Exploration of Linkages, 8 Auditing J. 
Prac. & Theory 101 (1989); Arnon E. Reichers, Conflict and 
Organizational Commitments, 71 J. Applied Psychol. 508, 511–12 
(1986). 
22. See, e.g., Aranya & Ferris, Reexamination, supra note 21, at 9–11; Gunz 
& Gunz, supra note 21, at 814. 
23. Sally Gunz, The New Corporate Counsel 3 (1991). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019 
Ethical Challenges in the Role of In-House Counsel 
959 
accountants, might arguably tend to resolve potential conflict in a 
manner consistent with the goals of the employer.24 If this was to occur, 
they would also be less inclined to report significant levels of OPC.25 
Lawyers, in contrast, have a lengthy history as independent 
professionals26 and have a particularly powerful external reference group 
in the form of the various bar associations and law societies.27 Arguably, 
 
24. That said, virtually all professions impose on their members an overriding 
responsibility to uphold the public interest. This is expressed in different 
forms. In law, the familiar expression is in terms of the duties that flow 
from the role as “officer of the court.” See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct pmbl. (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2017) (commenting that “[a] lawyer’s 
responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system 
and a public citizen are usually harmonious,” but “[i]n the nature of law 
practice . . . conflicting responsibilities are encountered” between 
professional duties and the need for “earning a satisfactory living”); cf. id. 
at r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (explaining that a lawyer’s duty to advocate for their 
client may come into conflict with their duty to not present evidence they 
know to be false to the court). The auditor must maintain objectivity. See 
Code of Prof’l Conduct and Bylaws 0.300.050.04 (AICPA 2018), 
https://pub.aicpa.org/codeofconduct/ethicsresources/et-cod.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZNK6-GA43] (“For a member in public practice, the 
maintenance of objectivity and independence requires a continuing 
assessment of client relationships and public responsibility. Such a 
member who provides auditing and other attestation services should be 
independent in fact and appearance. In providing all other services, a 
member should maintain objectivity and avoid conflicts of interest.”). 
There are equivalent responsibilities for the actuary. See Code of Prof’l 
Conduct Precept 1 (Society of Actuaries 2001), https://www. 
soa.org/Files/static-pages/about/.../soa-code-of-professional-conduct.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WZ5E-2JUR] (“[A]ct honestly, with integrity and 
competence, and in a manner to fulfill the profession’s responsibility to 
the public . . . .”); id. at 70. (“The purpose of this Code of Professional 
Conduct (‘Code’) is to require Actuaries to adhere to the high standards 
of conduct, practice, and qualifications of the actuarial profession, thereby 
supporting the actuarial profession in fulfilling its responsibility to the 
public.”). 
25. Please note that at all times during these studies the focus was on what 
the individual professional perceived and reported, not what is actually 
the case. The latter reality would, of course, be difficult to observe other 
than in a laboratory setting. 
26. There are in fact many ways of classifying professions. Generally, there 
are considered to be three ‘ancient’ professions: law, medicine, and the 
priesthood. One description of these three is as “collegiate.” See Terence 
J. Johnson, Professions and Power 45 (1972) (defining collegiate as 
a form of control through an autonomous occupational association). 
27. Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyer’s Response to Organizational 
Professional Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making 
of In-House Counsel, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 241, 250 n.33 (2002) (“[The 
collegiate professions] were evidenced by a degree of mystification of 
knowledge that increased the power and social distance between 
professional and client. The problems clients brought to the professional 
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if there was ever a profession equipped to resist employer pressure to 
compromise professional ethical obligations, the law would be it.28 Thus, 
we might expect the perceived experience of OPC to be higher for 
employed lawyers than that reported by other professions—for 
example, higher than accountants in particular. In our own study of a 
large sample of in-house counsel, this was, however, not in fact the case. 
Our findings of perceived OPC were remarkably consistent with those 
of other studies of different employed professionals.29 
At this stage, all we could do was posit possible explanations for 
this unexpected outcome.30 We did observe that the more in-house 
counsel saw their careers moving into senior management itself—and 
there had long been evidence that this was a common career path31—
the more committed they were to the employing organization and the 
less they reported experiencing OPC.32 What might this mean? Perhaps 
our assumption that lawyers should experience OPC, because of the 
nature of their profession itself, was flawed. Was it possible that those 
entering the in-house profession, and thus becoming employed lawyers, 
are often quite different in terms of their professional expectations than 
those in PSFs?  Maybe they simply miss the potential conflict because 
they are more inclined to think like a manager than a lawyer? 
Alternatively, might the results of our study suggest that lawyers are 
simply highly effective at balancing ethical responsibilities and therefore 
do not experience conflict? They find ways of ensuring they remain in 
compliance with their professional obligations.33 More troubling, might 
it simply be the case that employers nimbly side-step in-house counsel 
altogether when faced with an issue they might sense would raise 
concerns from the perspective of professional independence?34 
 
called for that professional to become aware of issues of real intimacy to 
the client and, as a result, the client would often experience a sense of 
vulnerability.”). 
28. See Gunz & Gunz, supra note 2, at 871. 
29. Id. at 873. 
30. See H.P. Gunz & S.P. Gunz, Ethical Implications of the Employment 
Relationship for Professional Lawyers, 28 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 123, 
136 (1994) (hypothesizing that OPC among corporate counsel was lower 
than expected either because conflicts are infrequently encountered, or 
corporate counsel exhibit characteristics different than those traditionally 
associated with the profession). 
31. Gunz, supra note 23, at 135–36. 
32. Gunz & Gunz, supra note 2, at 857. 
33. Gunz, supra note 23, at 75–76. 
34. See id. at 162 (noting that in-house corporate counsel may have difficulty 
managing outside counsel where they are not also the primary decision-
makers in hiring outside counsel). 
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As we explored these alternate explanations, it was increasingly 
obvious that sweeping assumptions about who in-house counsel are and 
how they might react to pressures assumed to be inherent to their 
position risked our drawing overly simplistic conclusions. There are 
significant differences in size of corporate legal departments, types of 
organization, and roles of counsel. Our expectation became that real 
understanding of ethical reasoning by counsel called for a far better 
understanding of the individual and the context in which they worked, 
a conclusion not inconsistent with that of Dr. Schaefer in her current 
article.35 
II. Ethical Decision-Making and In-House Counsel 
Practice 
In order to understand ethical decision-making and its challenges 
in corporate counsel practice, it is first necessary to have at least some 
understanding of what the practice itself looks like and what purpose it 
is intended to serve in the organization.36 Starting with the second part 
of this question, there has typically been a clear divergence over the 
years in terms of response. One view of the corporate counsel function 
in the organization is that it is there to “do law.”37 The alternate 
response includes a perspective of counsel as the manager of legal 
services and needs. For example, the following description by Chayes 
and Chayes still finds resonance amongst most counsel today: in-house 
practice includes “(1) preventive or anticipatory legal services, 
including longer range planning and programmatic prevention, and (2) 
management of outside counsel.”38 Often the role is further couched in 
terms of saving costs, although such a goal undoubtedly does the 
function a real disservice and any organization introducing a legal 
department solely to meet this goal will likely be disappointed and may 
well fall far short of achieving full potential value.39 
There are clear risks associated with either of these alternate 
descriptions for any in-house law department. Each description has 
 
35. Schaefer, supra note 1. 
36. For a more complete discussion about the history and current state of in-
house practice, see Gunz & Jennings, supra note 8. 
37. Gunz, supra note 23, at 3. 
38. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 9, at 280. 
39. See, e.g., Warren Bongard, Corporate In-House Counsel on the Increase, 
Fin. Post (Apr. 24, 2012, 8:34 AM), https://business.financialpost.com/ 
executive/corporate-in-house-counsel-on-the-increase [https://perma.cc/ 
MC63-LPT7] (“There are obviously many great reasons to have in-house 
counsel, but the single best reason is not cost saving. While reducing costs 
is certainly a benefit, it is probably not even one of the top three 
reasons.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019 
Ethical Challenges in the Role of In-House Counsel 
962 
serious implications both in terms of meeting the needs of the 
organization and how the function complies with its ethical 
responsibilities.40 Lawyers who simply ‘do law’ without integrating the 
delivery of that service into the needs of the organization may offer 
diminished value. The primary concern is that the department can 
become essentially a captive private law firm. While at first blush this 
might be attractive to managers—access to your own law firm without 
any of the pain of interacting with high priced, external lawyers—a 
department that looks inwards for its work definition runs the real risk 
of failing to understand actual organizational needs. Further, if left to 
its own devices, the department will define its work load according to 
personal expertise and preference far more than what makes sense from 
an economic perspective. This will be discussed further below. In terms 
of compliance with ethical responsibilities, the captive law firm model 
runs the risk of failing to understand what is really happening in the 
organization and where, therefore, it should be providing not only strict 
legal but also ethical guidance.41 
At the same time, where a legal department focuses too extensively 
on management issues,42 the risk becomes that the department’s 
 
40. Gunz & Jennings, supra note 8. 
41. It was once not uncommon to hear the general counsel described as the 
“conscience” of the firm. This notion has also been used more recently in 
the corporate context:  
Conscience is also an important component of the GC role. 
Championing diversity, encouraging the enterprise to act ethically 
and responsibly, adherence to the law and high ethical standards, 
devoting resources to pro bono activities, “re-educating” the 
corporate legal team, and defending democracy and the 
institutions supporting it are all important aspects of the General 
counsel’s [sic] role as the standard bearer for the corporate 
conscience. The GC must lead by example, serving as a pillar of 
strength, fairness, and credibility within the department, the 
enterprise, the community and beyond.  
 Mark A. Cohen, General Counsel: Guardian and Conscience of the 
Company, Forbes (Aug. 14, 2017, 1:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/markcohen1/2017/08/14/general-counsel-guardian-and-conscience-of-
the-company/#482e8d5763a9 [https://perma.cc/XZY5-6534]. This 
terminology is far from universally accepted as sound. See, e.g., Jerome 
Doraisamy, In-House Lawyers are Not ‘Gatekeepers’ of Corporate 
Conscience, Law. Wkly. (May 29, 2018), https://www.lawyersweekly. 
com.au/corporate-counsel/23333-in-house-lawyers-are-not-gatekeepers-of-
corporate-conscience [https://perma.cc/XBG3-RUM8] (arguing that 
businesses should not delegate their corporate conscience to in-house 
counsel).  
42. It is not uncommon to have several “departments” in different branches 
of the organization. This tends to be the case in large organizations and 
ones that are geographically dispersed. There typically, however, remains 
a lead department with oversight for all operations. Deborah A. DeMott, 
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members lose sight of their value to the organization as lawyers.43 
Lawyers are hired often at a cost premium to the organization.44 They 
are hired for their legal expertise. For the most part, lawyers have 
minimal business training,45 and the vast majority of in-house counsel 
come to their present position either directly upon qualification or, more 
typically, from private practice.46 Their value, in other words, comes 
 
The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 955, 970 
(2005). 
43. For a full discussion of the risk, see Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel 
Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 
Ind. L.J. 479, 531–32 (1989). One example of this risk has been described 
as follows:  
More generally, to the extent general counsel participates at an 
early stage in shaping major transactions and corporate policy, 
counsel’s ability to bring detached, professional judgment to bear 
in assessing their legality may be compromised, especially when 
the question of legality is tinged in shades of gray as opposed to 
black and white. An executive who participates in formulating 
strategic corporate decisions is likely to view the steps necessary 
to implement them differently than would a more subsidiary actor 
within the organization. Even if a general counsel’s role as a 
lawyer always distances counsel somewhat from other members of 
the senior management team, counsel’s ongoing associations with 
them may sway counsel’s loyalties away from the corporation and 
toward more personalized loyalties focused on the agents who 
comprise the corporate senior management team. Additionally, as 
a member of the senior management team, counsel may tend to 
address legal questions in a manner that pays allegiance to the 
wisdom of executive-level commitments and perspectives, even in 
the absence of explicit instructions from other members of the 
team. 
 DeMott, supra note 42, at 968–69. 
44. See Rosen, supra note 43, at 508 (describing how law firms’ hourly rates 
include a price premium reflecting the investments that they make in their 
reputations). 
45. Undergraduate business degrees were not a common precursor to the law 
degree. See Gunz, supra note 23, at 123–28. Today, programs are offered 
to overcome the lack of business education. One such program is the 
Certified In-House Counsel Canada program, introduced in 2013 by the 
Canadian Corporate Counsel Association in conjunction with the Rotman 
School of Management. Jennifer Brown, Certified In-house Counsel, 
Canadian Law. (May 27, 2013), https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/ 
author/jennifer-brown/certified-in-house-counsel-2043/ [https://perma.cc/ 
XQS8-LU6N]. 
46. David B. Wilkins, a professor at Harvard Law School, notes: 
In the past, in-house departments were viewed as less prestigious 
destinations for young lawyers, and competition for entry was less 
tough than at law firms. Today, the relevant status between in-
house legal positions and law firms has been significantly reversed, 
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from their role as lawyers and not managers. Again, management might 
find such a department very much to its liking, particularly when 
management is risk averse. A lawyer who is prepared not only to advise 
on the law but also to suggest the appropriate management response to 
the law, removes one level of concern particularly to such a manager 
concerned as they are about making management errors. Further, at 
the most senior levels of strategic decision-making, a general counsel 
with very close ties to top management can become an important ally 
when it comes to reaching business decisions.47 While most counsel will 
find themselves from time to time answering what-do-you-think 
questions from management, real caution must be taken that they 
retain their primary function, namely, advising on matters relating to 
the legal issues of the firm. 
Many of the concerns for ethical decision-making when the focus is 
too extensively on management will be discussed later. However, a 
 
particularly at more senior levels. . . . [T]hey now have their pick 
of talented midlevel associates and junior partners from the best 
law firms, with senior in-house lawyers frequently recruited from 
the top ranks of the partnerships of outside firms. 
 David B. Wilkins, The In-House Counsel Movement, Metrics of Change, 
Legal Bus. World (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.legalbusinessworld. 
com/single-post/2017/01/20/The-In-House-Counsel-Movement-Metrics-
of-Change [https://perma.cc/8YP5-3BV3]. Additionally, a 2018 report 
from the Counsel Network found that: 
This year, 88% of in-house counsel report working in private 
practice before going in-house. The average tenure in private 
practice is 4.9 years. The greatest percentage of respondents (33%) 
had spent three to five years in private practice before going in-
house. The next highest (32%) spent more than five years in 
private practice. This is a return to the levels that we saw in 2012 
(35%). The number of years spent in private practice is highest 
with the GC Director Level (6.2 years) followed by the GC 
Executive Level (5.9 years) and Senior Counsel (5.8 years). The 
lowest number is with Legal Counsel at 3.2 years. 
 Couns. Network, In-House Counsel Compensation & Career 




47. DeMott has described this phenomenon: 
Even if a general counsel’s role as a lawyer always distances 
counsel somewhat from other members of the senior management 
team, counsel’s ongoing associations with them may sway 
counsel’s loyalties away from the corporation and toward more 
personalized loyalties focused on the agents who comprise the 
corporate senior management team. 
 DeMott, supra note 42, at 969. 
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serious concern about the role of in-house counsel was raised by Robert 
Eli Rosen in an important analysis of in-house counsel practice.48 Rosen 
saw the potential for harm arising in one of two ways. First, should in-
house counsel assume too expansive a role in briefing external counsel, 
there exists the potential for outside lawyers to view in-house counsel, 
and not the firm (and its managers) itself, as the client.49 Of greater 
concern was the potential for an in-house counsel becoming the primary 
access point to the firm for outside lawyers and the manager of the flow 
of information.50 While all in-house counsel need to manage who can 
brief outside counsel and when,51 the risk of counsel over-stepping this 
role and effectively controlling information flow means they may well 
assume more of a managerial role than they should.52 “First, in 
managing outside counsel’s work, inside counsel limit the questions and 
information outside counsel supply. Second, in centralizing control over 
legal services in the legal department, inside counsel manage what 
options other corporate actors explore.”53 Interestingly, this concern was 
expressed in a recent study by lawyers in outside law firms who 
identified times where “the outside lawyer may assume the information 
fully represents the interests of the client. And this may not always be 
the case.”54 
Undoubtedly most in-house counsel practice is a blend of doing and 
managing law or legal issues. And there are strong reasons for this 
beyond the personalities and expectations of the individual practitioner. 
Most in-house law departments are small and have always been so.55 
There are, of course, also very large departments that attract a good 
 
48. Rosen, supra note 43, at 480–81. 
49. Id. at 484–85. 
50. Id.  
51. Gunz, supra note 23, at 160–63; Ass’n of Corp. Counsel, 
Establishing the In-House Law Department: A Guide for an 
Organization’s First General Counsel 56 (2012), https://www. 
acc.com/_cs_upload/vl/membersonly/InfoPAK/1313060_1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7PVS-ZVXZ] (“Engagement with Outside Counsel—the 
guidelines should limit who can engage outside counsel to those approved 
by the general counsel and restrict discussions of legal matters with 
outside counsel to law department attorneys.”). 
52. Rosen, supra note 43, at 514. 
53. Id. at 515. 
54. Ronit Dinovitzer, Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, Reconsidering Lawyer 
Autonomy: The Nexus Between Firm, Lawyer, and Client in Large 
Commercial Practice, 51 Am. B. L. J. 661, 698 (2014). 
55. Susan Hackett, Inside Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in 
the In-House Profession, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 609, 610–11 (2002). 
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deal of attention but generally these are the exceptions.56 There has also 
always been some fluctuation both in size of departments and even their 
existence per se although, as a percentage of the total bar, the 
proportion of in-house counsel tends to remain remarkably unchanged.57 
Often, unfortunately, the comings and goings of actual departments is 
a result of relatively poor—and sometimes even impulsive—decision-
making by organizations seeking instant fixes, for example, to the cost 
of external services or alternatively reacting to the inevitable costs of 
internal departments.58 The significance of the size of department is 
that in many respects the size must define what can be achieved. 
Organizations with small departments comprised primarily of generalist 
lawyers will continue to incur significant external legal costs albeit with 
hope that there will also be the intended added value of the in-house 
lawyers introducing sound controls over such services.59 They ensure 
that the appropriate level of external service will be used and with the 
best value law firm for the particular issues. But such a model will not 
necessarily reduce costs per se. The well-managed department will 
provide the assurance, however, that what money is incurred is well 
spent.60 
The question of significance here is what is the relationship between 
the nature of the law department and ethical decision-making by 
counsel themselves? The work that follows is framed from the position 
that where we work and the nature of both the department itself in 
which we work and the organization as a whole affect how we make all 
 
56. Id. at 611. 
57. Id. at 610 (“[T]he in-house bar has remained, as best we can tell, largely 
unchanged as a percentage of the American bar as a whole since the ABA 
began conducting its census about fifty years ago. The common perception 
is that the in-house profession has been subject to larger fluctuations: 
periods of great growth in the 1980s and 1990s with recent significant 
downturns. In reality, however, it appears that the profession has grown 
and shrunk in direct proportion to the rest of the legal profession, always 
constituting about 10% of the bar.”) (internal citations omitted). 
58. While the following article is certainly highly contentious, it does have 
clear kernels of truth. Harrison Barnes, Why Going In-house Is Often the 
Worst Decision a Good Attorney Can Ever Make, BCG Att’y Search, 
https://www.bcgsearch.com/article/900045115/Why-Going-In-house-is-
Often-the-Worst-Decision-a-Good-Attorney-Can-Ever-Make/ [https:// 
perma.cc/MYB7-MGMS] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (asserting that in-
house attorneys “will become a ‘cost center’ and not a profit-generator (in 
most instances) and will be one of the first to go when the company 
experiences problems—and all companies do”). 
59. Hackett, supra note 55, at 611. 
60. For further discussion, see generally Constance E. Bagley, Winning 
Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 378 
(2008). 
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kinds of decisions, and ethical decisions in particular. While some of the 
conclusions drawn are founded in empirical studies, it should be made 
clear from the outset that there are few, if any, claims to causality.61 
By that we mean that while we might find certain types of decision-
making occurring in certain types of department, we make no claim 
that the department causes the decision maker to behave as they do. 
Nor, for that matter, do we know whether particular kinds of decision 
makers are attracted to certain departments or organizations. What we 
do report is what we observe, and while we may draw inferences for 
organizations to consider in our final section, we also want to ensure 
that the parameters around our original findings are understood. 
We begin with what we consider to be a non-controversial 
assumption that all in-house counsel are practicing lawyers and, as 
such, obligated to comply with the ethical dictates of their respective 
bar association or law society. Indeed, they are hired not solely for their 
technical expertise but also for their commitment to uphold the ethical 
principles of their profession.62 Of paramount significance to this 
observation is that in-house counsel must therefore ensure that at all 
times they act in the best interests of the client, which typically means 
the organization by which they are employed. This raises inherent 
challenges for counsel of a corporation—for example, while being a legal 
entity in its own right, a corporation operates through agents and it is 
these agents with whom counsel has their interaction.63 Further, these 
agents may well have interests that contradict those of the organization 
itself,64 irrespective of whether they might themselves owe fiduciary 
duties otherwise.65 
We suggested above that the “bad apple” hypothesis, while 
undoubtedly a force at work in many corporate scandals, is too stark 
to describe the forces typically at work in the offices of in-house 
counsels.66 Most counsel, for most of the time, endeavor to discharge  
61. See Gunz & Gunz, supra note 2, at 876. 
62. See Ralph Nader, Corporate Law Firms and Corporate Ethics, 2 J. Inst. 
For Study Legal Ethics 1, 5 (1999); see also Sol M. Linowitz & 
Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession 26 (1994). 
63. For convenience, we will continue to use the term corporation in this 
context since the majority of counsel are, in fact, employed within some 
corporate form, even when it is in a not-for-profit sector. 
64. Interestingly, in a recent study of lawyers in large commercial law firms, 
many failed to distinguish between the obligation to the true client, the 
corporation, and the needs of the manager with whom they typically 
interacted, and therefore failed to elevate an issue to a higher level where 
the manager’s actions raised ethical concerns. Dinovitzer, Gunz, & Gunz, 
supra note 54, at 716. 
65. For example, as directors and officers. 
66. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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their duties not only in accordance both with their training and the 
requirements of their profession but also in the interests of their 
employing organization. Next, we turn to work that has explored the 
pressures that act on in-house counsel in such a way as to affect the 
way they might react to the kind of ethical dilemmas they encounter in 
practice. 
III. Lessons Learned for the Ethical Role of 
Professionals 
The study we draw on surveyed Canadian corporate counsel,67 who 
were asked to respond to vignettes putting them in the position of 
having to decide how to respond to situations drawn from practice 
(albeit anonymized).68 Based on the precept noted above, that these 
professionals aim to act professionally, the study set out to see whether 
organizational influences could be identified that might affect the 
lawyers’ judgement, quite possibly, in ways that they are entirely 
unaware. The study drew on identity theory to structure its argument. 
We discussed above the concept of OPC and noted that, while it 
might be expected as a consequence of working as a lawyer for an 
employer with different aims than those of a law firm, a number of 
studies have established that in-house counsel and other professionals 
in similar situations report surprisingly low levels of OPC.69 The study 
we draw on here suggests an explanation for this well-established 
finding, based on identity theory.70 Identity is a widely used concept in 
organization studies.71 It has been described as a “relatively stable and 
enduring constellation of attributes, beliefs, values, motives, and 
experiences in terms of which people define themselves in a professional 
 
67. Gunz & Jennings, supra note 8 (“We have always made the case (and not 
been challenged) that other than in terms of scale, the professions look 
very similar at least in the major common law countries, and in the U.S. 
and Canada in particular. The interconnectedness of the latter two 
economies alone make this almost inevitably the case.”) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Gunz & Gunz, supra note 27, at 263 n.84. 
68. Gunz & Gunz, supra note 2, at 860–63. 
69. See supra notes 15–34 and accompanying text. 
70. See generally Herminia Ibarra, Provisional Selves: Experimenting with 
Image and Identity in Professional Adaptation, 44 Admin. Sci. Q. 764 
(1999); Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future 
of an Identity Theory, 63 Soc. Psychol. Q. 284 (2000). 
71. See generally Stefan Sveningsson & Mats Alvesson, Managing Managerial 
Identities: Organizational Fragmentation, Discourse and Identity Struggle, 56 
Hum. Rel. 1163 (2003). 
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role.”72 Individuals have multiple identities that come into play under 
differing circumstances and are organized into a salience hierarchy. 
Identity salience is “the probability that an identity will be invoked 
across a variety of situations, or alternatively across persons in a given 
situation . . . commitment shapes identity salience shapes role choice 
behavior.”73 Earlier research had shown that in-house counsel vary in 
the identities they adopt, between two poles labelled “technician” and 
“organization person.”74 In the more recent study, these were relabeled 
“professional” and “organizational.”75  
The ‘professional’ identity is adopted by someone who sees him- 
or herself as, for example, a lawyer, accountant or engineer who 
just happens to be working for the NPO in question . . . . The 
‘organizational’ identity is that of a professional who has taken 
on some of the characteristics of a non-professional employee of 
the NPO, in the limit, seeing him- or herself as an employee who 
just happens to have, for example, a law, accounting or 
engineering degree.”76 
To put it another way:  
[S]omeone enacting a professional identity will ask him- or herself: 
how does my profession require me to deal with this ethical 
dilemma? By contrast, someone adopting an organizational 
identity will ask him- or herself: how should I, as an employee of 
this [non-professional organization], deal with this ethical 
dilemma?77  
Drawing on the “logic of appropriateness”78 the individual is, in effect, 
asking themselves: “What does a person like me do in a situation like 
this?”79 
 
72. Ibarra, supra note 70, at 764–65 (citing Edgar H. Schein, Career 
Dynamics: Matching Individual and Organizational Needs 24–26 
(Richard Beckhard et al. eds., 1978)). 
73. Stryker & Burke, supra note 70, at 286. 
74. Gunz & Gunz, supra note 30, at 133. 
75. Gunz & Gunz, supra note 2, at 858–59. 
76. Id. at 855 (internal citations omitted). 
77. Id. (emphasis in original).  
78. James G. March, A Primer on Decision-Making: How Decisions 
Happen 58 (1994). 
79. J. Mark Weber et al., A Conceptual Review of Decision Making in Social 
Dilemmas: Applying a Logic of Appropriateness, 8 Personality Soc. 
Psychol. Rev. 281, 282 (2004). 
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In order to establish the identity that respondents regarded as most 
salient, they were asked to say where they fell on a scale that ranged 
from “[l]awyer with captive client” at one end and “[e]mployee of 
organization who happens to have law degree” at the other.80 While half 
of the respondents put themselves at the midpoint of the scale, a third 
put themselves at the professional end and the remaining 17 percent at 
the organizational end.81 
The respondents were also presented with several vignettes drawn 
from professional practice in three cases and, in the fourth, from the 
famous Texaco boardroom imbroglio.82 Each vignette represented an 
ethical dilemma in the sense that it raised issues of professional ethics, 
but there was no ideal solution; however, one participant in the study 
responded that any decision would have a downside for someone. The 
vignettes were anonymized and carefully tested on a pilot group of 
subjects for their realism and their lack of bias, the latter in the sense 
that it was important not to bias the wording in favor of one type of 
response or the other.83 In each case, the respondents were given two 
possible courses of action for them to take, each based on one of the 
identities.84 The courses of action were carefully worded to ensure that 
they represented reasonable actions for an in-house counsel to take 
without breaking any laws or rules of professional practice. For 
example, in the (disguised) Texaco case the respondent is general 
counsel and compliance officer for a large corporation with a major 
public profile.85 “[T]he top management team (TMT) is almost 
uniformly WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant),” and it is common 
for its members to inject racist comments into their conversation.86 On 
the one hand, the subject is told that they are aware that if these 
comments became public it would be a public relations disaster for the 
company, and there was a risk that a disaffected employee might well 
make this happen. On the other, the executives in question are the 
subject’s friends and colleagues and have already reacted to mild 
attempts to change their behavior with derision. The respondents were 
given two choices, one organizational—an in-camera, non-minuted 
discussion in which the risks are pointed out and it is suggested that  
80. Gunz & Gunz, supra note 2, at 864. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 861–62; see Thomas S. Mulligan & Chris Kraul, Texaco Settles Race 
Bias Suit for $176 Million, L.A. Times (Nov. 16, 1996), http://articles. 
latimes.com/1996-11-16/news/mn-65290_1_texaco-settles-race-bias-suit/2 
[https://perma.cc/29HG-9DJL]. 
83. Gunz & Gunz, supra note 2, at 861–62. 
84. Id. at 861. 
85. Id. at 861, 885. 
86. Id. at 885. 
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the executives keep their behavior strictly private; and the other 
professional—a formal note that goes to the TMT explaining that if the 
situation does not change it will have to be reported to the board.87 
There were two main findings from the study. First, the identity 
claimed by the respondent predicted well the approach they said they 
would take with each of the vignettes: those with organizational 
identities preferred organizational responses, and those with 
professional identities preferred professional responses.88 
Second, it was possible to explain some of the reasons for adopting 
one identity over the other based on information the respondents 
provided about themselves. They were given a list of ten items drawn 
from research on the work of corporate counsel and asked to describe 
the allocation of their time between the items.89 Some (e.g. routine legal 
matters and caseload, legal counselling) were clearly professional, while 
others (e.g. management outside the legal department, government 
liaison) were more obviously non-professional. The greater the 
proportion of their time was spent on non-professional work, the more 
likely they were to say that they had organizational identities.90 
Furthermore, a workload biased towards non-professional work was also 
associated with a feeling of isolation from the organization’s strategic 
decision-making process.91 In other words, the more involved the counsel 
were in the strategic management of the organization and the more 
time they spent on non-professional work, the more likely they were to 
adopt an organizational identity and to resolve the ethical dilemmas 
they were presented with in an organizational, as opposed to 
professional, manner. 
Other features of their work situation also appeared to play a part 
in deciding how they handled the dilemmas. The most interesting 
involved the vulnerability the respondents felt towards their work being 
outsourced, an outcome commonly faced by in-house counsel. The more 
vulnerable they felt, the more likely they were to adopt an 
organizational identity and choose organizational solutions to the 
dilemmas.92 
To summarize, then, this study produced disquieting findings with 
respect to the way in which in-house counsel might be expected to 
respond to ethical dilemmas. Nothing in the study addressed the 
individual ethical standards of the counsel. There may or may not have 
 
87. Id. at 885–86. 
88. Id. at 874. 
89. Id. at 863. 
90. Id. at 871. 
91. Id. at 869, 871. 
92. Id. at 858. 
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been some bad apples in the 484 counsel who responded, but the study’s 
authors had no way of knowing whether this was the case. On the other 
hand, it was possible to predict something of the way that each 
respondent would respond to the dilemmas by knowing something of 
their situation in the organization: how involved they felt themselves 
to be in the firm’s strategic leadership, and whether they felt their work 
to be at risk of outsourcing. Firms hire in-house counsel in order to 
have legal expertise at hand. But this expertise risks being subject to a 
phenomenon known as “client capture.”93 Normally used to reference 
the client’s power to “capture” the professional by “undermin[ing] 
professional prerogatives and status”;94 in the case of corporate counsel, 
the risk that is evident in this study’s findings is that, consciously or 
otherwise, the professional advice that corporations get from their in-
house counsel may be less “professional” than they realize, and the more 
closely they involve their counsel in the operations of the company, the 
less “professional” it may be. But it is a frequent recommendation that 
in-house counsel should be involved in the corporation’s management;95 
otherwise, so goes the argument, why have in-house counsel at all? Why 
not just outsource legal work to law firms specializing in corporate law? 
So a paradox emerges—the arguments favoring the use of in-house 
counsel and its effective deployment also result in the legal advice being 
potentially less useful to the firm, or, at least, not as disinterested and 
unbiased as expected. On the other hand, as pointed out above, a legal 
department that isolates itself from the firm’s management may be seen 
to be not earning its keep. 
Conclusion 
In our review of recent thinking on the ethical challenges facing in-
house counsel, we have covered a reasonable amount of territory. 
Perhaps our key theme is one of avoiding simplistic explanations for 
unethical behavior observed amongst professionals supporting business. 
On the one hand, it is certainly the case that ethical transgressions 
in the business world may be facilitated, and if not facilitated then at 
least not inhibited, by professionals who, were they to have adhered 
strictly to their professional codes of conduct, would have behaved 
otherwise. The cry of “where were the lawyers?” needs to be heard. On 
the other hand, the individual ethical standards of individual 
professionals undoubtedly varies, and—as the Enron case demonstrated 
 
93. Kevin T. Leicht & Mary L. Fennell, Professional Work: A 
Sociological Approach 106 (2001). 
94. Id. at 105. 
95. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 9, at 281 (“The general counsel, as a 
part of senior management, is committed to optimizing business success, 
and has both the right and responsibility to insist upon early legal 
involvement in major transactions that will raise significant legal issues.”). 
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all too vividly—there are certainly professionals who are apparently 
prepared to behave in surprisingly unethical ways. However, these so-
called bad apples may or may not, to follow the metaphor, infect the 
rest of the barrel, but they are probably relatively rare. Of greater 
concern is the possibility that the working environment of a professional 
may lead them to act in ways that are not entirely consistent with their 
professional training. In other words, ordinary, decent lawyers who put 
in a particular environment may act in ways that feel right to them but 
not to others. We explored the findings of research that suggests that 
in-house counsel can be particularly vulnerable to these pressures 
because they are working in an organizational environment that is 
fundamentally non-professional. 
It should be noted that we are not describing here behavior that is 
flagrantly illegal or unethical, nor situations that are particularly 
uncommon in practice. Ethical dilemmas come in many shapes and 
sizes, but the ones that we are concerned with here are those that are 
most commonly encountered in everyday professional life, so-called low-
intensity ethical dilemmas.96 The vignettes used in the research 
described in Part III provide situations that were realistic to the 
research subjects. In an earlier study, nearly half of in-house counsel 
surveyed said that they had encountered situations similar to those in 
the vignettes, and of those who had, over half said they encountered 
them at least twice in the past two years.97  
To summarize, the pressures identified in the research affect the 
ethical decision-making of ordinary, decent in-house counsel, and the 
situations in which such decisions-making is required are not 
uncommon. While universities and professional bodies teaching ethics 
to future professional practitioners inevitably and not incorrectly focus 
on the prescripts of the relevant professional codes, the message from 
the line of research cited in this Article is that this will provide a far 
from complete or even adequate preparation for future careers. It is 
essential to ensure that professionals, and all managers and employees, 
understand that ethical decisions are made within a context and that 
context subtly influences how decisions are made. At the extreme (e.g. 
Enron), if immense rewards go to those who cut corners and who engage 
in aggressive and often opaque practices, it should not be surprising 
that maintenance of high ethical standards is simply not a particularly 
relevant consideration. But the message from our findings is that we 
are all affected by the world in which we work, and this in turn can 
 
96. Dov Zohar, Inst. for Work & Health, Presentation at the Nova Scotia 
Safety Council Conference at Halifax, Nova Scotia: Safety as a Marker of 




97. Gunz & Gunz, supra note 27, at 259–65. 
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result in very subtle shifts and differences in terms of how we reason 
through issues of ethical responsibility. In most contexts the magnitude 
of these shifts will not result in out-right bad ethical decision-making. 
But being a good person is not alone protection from influences that 
will lead to less than optimal decisions. The way our identity is shaped 
and the way our environment impacts the expectations of our role in 
the organization all impact how we ultimately resolve ethical dilemmas 
and reach decisions. It is beholden upon all of us, and upon  in-house 
counsel in particular, to understand the world in which we operate and, 




98. See Mary C. Gentile, Giving Voice to Values: How to Speak 
Your Mind When You Know What’s Right 171–173 (2010) 
(discussing how people in the workplace make unethical decisions often 
because of emotions and instinct, rather than reason, and the arguments 
of ways to respond to the reasons and rationalizations around us). 
